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Abstract
This paper tries to answer the question: how important are the financial factors in
two declines of corporate investment in th  1990’s in Japan? We find (1) in 1992-1994
the financial factor, specifically an increase in call rate during 1989-91, partly
contributed to the decline of investment especially indirectly through the real factor, but
it was not a dominant factor; and (2) in 1998-1999 credit crunch which is induced by the
so-called banking crisis played a significant role in the decline of investment directly and
indirectly. Eliminating this shock leads the corporate investment to positive growth from
negative 7-8% growth, and (3) incorporating interaction between financial factors and
real factors (financial accelerator effect) greatly increases the estimate of financial factor
effect. In other words, considering only direct effect may lead to  significant
underestimate of financial factor effect.
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Throughout the 1990’s, the Japanese economy experienced two recessions. Fir t, after
the burst of the bubblei, real GDP growth dropped from 4.5% (1985-1991 average:
calendar year) to 0.9% (1992-1995). Second, after the recovery of 1996 (5.0%)ii, it
declined to -0.2% (1997-1999 (til Q3)).
In both periods, corporate investment contributed to those declines the most among
the components of GDP. In the 1992-94 period, the contribution of corporate investment
to real GDP growth rate was –1.3% (1992-1995 average). Also in 1998-99, it was –1.2%
(Table 1).
It is extremely important to know the causes which induced these declines of
corporate investment to understand the Japanese economy in the 1990’s. Although
various candidates of causes have been proposed, we may be able to classify them in
three rough categories.
(1) Business Conditions (investment opportunity) storyiii.
Corporate investment drops because there is little investment opportunity. This
explanation is based on traditional neoclassical investment theory in which shadow value
of additional unit of capital, the so-called Tobin’s marginal q determines the level of
capital stock (investment). Along a similar line, one can argue that active investment in
the bubble eraiv led to excess capital stock after the bubble, which decreased the
investment in 90’s as the adjustment process to the optimal level of capital stockv.
(2) Asymmetric information story (borrower’s balance sheet effect)
 Recently it has been widely p rceived that there is informational asymmetry in
capital market in the sense that suppliers of funds do not know all the information about
6the borrowers’ (firms’) projects. This causes well-known “adverse selection” and
“moral hazard” problemvi. Combined with a limited liability of borrowers (in th  case of
bankruptcy “suppliers” may not recover their loan in full), the supply of funds becomes
less than the optimal level. In order to solve this problem, say, banking sector, which is
typical supplier of external funds in Japan, takes assets(land, stock etc.) of borrowers as
collateral. Since the collateral value declined after the bubble period, this asymmetric
information problem was exacerbated, hence lending and investment declined. Therefore
the balance sheet of borrowers matters.
Note that this story assumes that the behavior of the lender side is fixed. That is,
without the deterioration of the financial condition of supply side explained below, the
deterioration of borrower’s balance sheet itself can lower the lending and investment.
(3) Credit Crunch story (lender’s balance sheet effect)
Contrary to (2), this story focuses on lenders’ balance sheets, especially those of the
banking sector. The decline of asset price through the increase of non-performing loan
yields shortage of equity capital of banking sector, which induces them to reduce asset
(=loan) in order to maintain the ratio of equity to asset, hence investment declines.
Combined with BIS capital regulationvii, this view attracts considerable attention
especially in the decline of investment during 1998-99viii. In addition to this capital
crunch effect, especially after November 1997 the situation so-called ‘financi  system
shockix’ have emerged. We conceptually think of all of those changes in lender’s attitude
as credit crunch effect.
7We could also explain the decline of investment by a different perspective:
“macroeconomic policy”. Fiscal policy works mainly through (1) raising the investment
opportunities. Monetary policy may work through all of them, increasing the profitable
project ((1)), raising land and stock prices ((2)) and recovering bank balance sheet by
increasing profit of banking sector ((3)) by lowering interest rate. In a sense they are 
more fundamental cause than (1)-(3).
Note that (1) and (2) are about the borrower’s side of the credit market while (3)
concerns the lender’s side. We can also classify them by real factor((1)) and financial
factors((2)&(3)). Of course these two factors are mutually correlated and may cause a
vicious cycle, specifically the deterioration of balance sheet of either borrower or lender
reduce investment at first place, and depress economy that, in turn, hurt the balance sheet
of both sides again. This role of financial factor is called ‘financial accelerator’ in the
literaturex.
A lot of empirical researches have been done about the asymmetric information on
investment decision. For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Perterson (1988), Hoshi,
Kasyhap and Scharfstein (1991), using firm-level data, emphasized the importance of this
information problem for low dividend payout firms (US), non-Keiretsu firms (Japan),
respectively. Sekine (1999) also claimed thecredit crunch story is significant for non-
Keiretsu firms in recent Japan. Using the aggregate data, Yoshikawa and Motonishi
(1999), Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) showed that especially small firms suffer from
financial distress, and this effect can explain the significant portion of GDP decline in
recent Japan.
8The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of the financial factor in recent
downturns in Japan and to know how important it is in the aggregate sense.
This paper is different from those two existing papers (Yoshikawa and Motonishi
(1999), Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000)) which focused on aggregate effect of financial
factor in many respects. We connect the financial factor with the traditional q-theory of
investment with asymmetric information and credit crunch. Then we not only emphasize
the importance of financial variable in the aggregate but also show that there were
actually financial shocks, which lead the investment to the recent decline. We also show
that the more financially distressed industries are less responsive to real shocks, which is
consistent with the theory.
Section 2 explains standard q-theory of investment incorporating the effects explained
above and derive the equation to be estimated. Section 3 summarizes previous empirical
results in the litera u e of this area and states the problems related to the estimation or the
data they used. Section 4 explains the data and specification of estimating the equation
we use and claim the validity of our specification and variables.  Section 5 gives
estimation results and computes aggregate effect of financial factor. The results obtained
are compared with the other analysis of this area. Also p liminary analysis shows
importance of ‘financial accelerator effect’.  Section 6 concludes.
2. Theory of Investment
2.1 q-approach
Here we derive an explicit form of investment equation, into which we can
incorporate the factors explained above as an explanatory variable. Assuming convex
9costs of adjusting the capital stock, C(I,K), representative firm are supposed to maximize
the expected present discounted value of net cash flow, ie,
subject to the capital accumulation constraint:
    for all s.  Et stands for expectations operator using information available at time t, b is
discount rate, “pai” is the usual profit function, K is capital stock at the beginning of time
t, I is investment, p is relative price of capital goods and “delta” is depreciation rate.
First-order condition with respect to investment yields
where q is the present discounted value of the increase in profit by new investment. This
is also known as Tobin’s marginal q (q:henceforth). Following Hayashi (1982) we
assume the particular form of adjustment cost (such that marginal adjustment cost with
respect to investment is linear in I/K) below
Then we get explicit form of investment equation
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Note that this marginal q is not observable. Under the assumptions made by Hayashi
(1982) (homogenous capital goods, homogenous of degree one production function and
adjustment cost function and efficient stock market), we can use average q (Q,
henceforth) which is observed in financial marketxi inst ad of marginal q (minus p with
the assumption of perfect competition in factor and product market). Hence (3) can be
written with the error term e as
This is the basic equation which has been widely estimated in the literature of this area
under the assumption of a perfect capital market.
2.2 Violation of frictionless capital market
We assumed above that the firm can finance from a perfect capital market. In other
words, the firm can invest all projects which yield more than market interest rate (Figure
1-a). More realistically we incorporate asymmetry of information about the project the
firm invests (the firm knows more about the project than the investor does). This
asymmetry of information, which could arise in various forms such as the choice and use
of capital, investment opportunities, risk ness of projects and so on, can lead to adverse
selection and/or moral hazard. For example, following Myers and Majluf (1984), if
managers of the firm are better informed than investors about the firm’s prospects and are
assumed to act in the interest of old shareholders, and investors correctly know the
conflict of interests between them, then the rational investor would require premium on













has two parts: horizontal part at interest rate r (collateralized part: up to the level of net
worth) and upward sloping part (uncollateralized part). There is a kink at the quantity of
collateralized asset, or net worthxii(Figure 1-b). Other explanations of asymmetric
information have similar consequences about the cost of funds.
We can think of two types of firms. The demand curve for capital stock which is
downward-sloping crosses the supply curve at either (1) horizontal part or (2) upward-
sloping part. If (1), we call this type of firms as  “Unconstrained firm”, a small decrease
of net worth (collateralized asset) (leftward shift of supply curve) does not change the
level of capital stock (Figure 1-c). We call (2) as “Constrained firm” since the depress
of net worth decreases the capital stock(from K  to Kc’) and increase the required rate of
return.
To investigate this effect of the change in net worth on investment, many studies have
used the modified specification of (4)
where CF is the cash flow as a proxy for the change in net worth.
Note that a shift in the demand curve in Figure 1-d is captured by Q. By controlling
the demand curve we can estimate the role of net worth. Figure 1-d implies that esti ated
‘b’ in (4)’ for the constrained firms should be smaller than for the unconstrained firms
precisely because they are constrained by the upward-sloping parts of supply curve. Also
‘c’ in (4)’ should be significantly larger than zero for constrained firms while it should be

























In addition to the asymmetric information problem (balance sheet problem of
borrowers)  described above, we are interested in the effect of the credit crunch of
banking sector to investment (balance sheet problem of lenders).
When the equity capital is damaged as in the situation of Japan in the 90’s, the
banking sector, in trying to recover the equity capital ratio, may cut lendingxiii. This can
be represented by the shift of supply curve in credit market. It may be natural to think that
the slope of the upward-sloping part of the supply curve goes up (Figure 1-e).
In the framework using (4)’, we can think this effect as follows. Credit crunch does
not change the level of capital stock of unconstrained firm given investment opportunity
(demand curve), and net worth fixed. Hence the coefficients of those two effects are the
same when there is capital crunch and otherwise. On the other hand, for the constrained
firm, those coefficients are different in two situations. ‘b’ the effect of Q gets smaller
with capital crunch, and ‘c’ the effect of net worth gets larger, than the case without
capital crunch.
Alternatively, we could use the variable (call it as BANK) which stands for the
financial situation of the bank’s balance sheet. We can estimate
 where BANK can be capital-asset ratio, (inverse of) non-performing ratio or credit rating
























3. Problems in estimation
Although we get the explicit specification like (4)’ or (4)’’, we still have some
problems in estimation for our purpose, which is to know the aggregate effect of financial
factors on investment.
Suppose we have aggregate (macro-level) data. Our data set consists of (I/K), Q
which depends on the stock price, (CF/pK) and BANK. Since all of the explanatory
variables as well as (I/K) are presumably procyclical, it may be very difficult to get robust
estimated coefficients. In other words, time-series variation may not be enough to
identify those effects separately in which we are interestedxiv. It means that we need
another variation in the data.
For this reason, previous literatur  in this area has focused on cross-sectional (or
panel) micro data hoping that cross sectional variation(in addition to the time-series
variation) can solve the identification problem above.
There is a lot of literature which focuses on the role of net worth and bank’s financial
condition by estimating (4)’ or (4)’’ using micro firm-level data. Since their purpose is to
test the existence of financial effect ((2), (3)), they split the entire sample into constrained
firms and unconstrained firms by a prioricriterionxv, and estimate (4)’ or (4)’’seperately.
Using Japanese data, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Sekine (1999) and others
estimate (4)’ and find significantly larger estimated coefficient of CF for the constrained
group than for unconstrained group, which is predicted in Section 2xvi. Sekine (1999) also
estimate (4)’’ and find significant estimated coefficient of BANK for the constrained
group, but not for unconstrained group, which is also predicted by the theory in Section
2xvii.
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As a whole, literature in this area concludes that at least some firms face capital
market imperfection but its effect on the aggregate investment is uncertai . Also they
conclude there is acredit crunch effect for somefirms for some periods in recent Japan,
but its aggregate role is also unclear.
Still those approaches employed in the literature using firm-level micro data also have
some problems, especially for our purpose. First of all, it has been widely perceived that
Q may not be measured correctly to capture the investment opportunity of the firm. This
measurement error could arise if one of Hayashi’s assumptions (which ensures the
equality of q and Q) is violated. One could argue that the stock market is not efficient,
i.e., it may contain bubblexviii, or capital goods market is not homogenous. Then Q i  not
a good proxy for marginal q and does not capture the investment opportunity anymore.
Second, under the first problem of measurement error of Q, CF (cash flow, or the
variable which stands for firm’s balance sheet) may contain information about the
investment opportunity which should be fully captured by Q. In this case the estimated
coefficient of CF could be significantly positive even if CF has actually no effect on
investmentxix. Therefore we may not know the effect of financial factor correctly. Third,
Q may change as BANK moves, that is, the stock price of the firm may decline when the
firm’s main bank faces a serious financial situation. But this decline of the firm’s stock
price  should be classified as financial factor, not real factor or the investment
opportunity. Again we face the contamination of real and financial factors. Finally, usual
micro data does not include the information about small firms. Even if they do, Q maybe
hard to obtain for small firms. In addition to the small firm problem, non-manufacturing
firm-level data seems to have some problem. When estimating (4)’’ using non-
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manufacturing firm-level data, Sekine(1999) reports that “preliminary estimates [using
non-manufacturing firm data] did not reveal any sensible results probably because of
heterogeneity of the sample”.  Because the investment share of the small firms as well as
non-manufacturing firms in Japan is largexx and the response of them to financial factor
could be significantly different from that of the large (manufacturing) firms, we may not
know the role of each factor in the aggregate sense.
We try to solve these problems using different sets of variables as proxies for real and
financial factors. For this advantage, we give up the distinction between both balance
sheet effectsxxi.
4. Data and Specification
 4.1 Data
In this section, we explain the data and the specification of the estimated equation,
and discuss the validity of them.
We use the investment data by industry (‘Capital stock statistics of private
corporations’ by Economic Planning Agency) and diffusion indices (DI’s) by industry (in
the Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan (Tank n) by Bank of Japan) so that we
can avoid some serious problems in estimation pointed out in Section 3. First, by using
the data by industry, we can exploit the cross-sectional variation, and may mitigate the
identification problem when using aggregate data. Second, using DI’s may make us
differentiate the financial factor from real factor (discussed below in detail), unlike using
Q, CF and BANK. Finally we can obtain aggregate results since our data conceptually
contain all sizes of firms. For this advantage, we give up the identification of credit
16
crunch from net worth effect, equivalently lenders’ balance sheets from borrowers’
balance sheets.
The EPA data has quarterly series of investment and capital stock by industry. The
Diffusion Index in the survey by Bank of Japan is frequently cited statistics by many
macro economists in Japan as well as by theJapanese government. This survey asks
firms questions about its current and predicted future situation, such as ‘business
condition’, and the firms are asked to answer in 3 choices. ‘Favorable’, ‘Not so
favorable’ or ‘Unfavorable’(in case of ‘business condition’). For example if 20% of firms
answer ‘favorable’ and 50% answer ‘unfavorable’(remaining 30% answer ‘Not so
favorable’), then BC at that point is minus 30(=20-50). This is done in quarterly basis,
and available by industry.
 DI’s we will focus on are (1) “Forecast on the next quarter’s business condition
DI”(BC henceforth) which equals ‘f vorable’ minus ‘unfavorable’ and (2) “Lending
attitude of financial institutions DI”(FA) which equals ‘accommodative’ minus ‘severe’.
We will use BC as a proxy for the real factor and FA for the financial factor. We also use
(3) “Production Capacity DI” (KDI) which equals ‘excessive’ minus ‘shortage’ of capital
stock as a supplement for BC since this is available only for manufacture for whole
sample period. Appendix I gives precise information about them.
Data used in our analysis starts at the 1st quarter of 1976 and ends at the 3rd quarter of
1999xxii. Since we have seven industries and 95 quarters, we can use at most 665
observations in our estimation. Sample statistics are given in Table 2 and figures of those
variables are given in Figure 2-a,b,c,dxxiiixxiv.
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It may be useful to note some of the characteristics of the data. For example, as for
the construction industry, I/K has a larger variation than other industries (standard
deviation : 0.78), probably because BC fluctuates a lot (sd : 23.8). We can also make sure
of the fact in figures. Also it is interesting to note that only this industry has declining I/K
throughout the 90’s probably because BC of construction did not recover in 1994-96. The
real estate industry has a similar tendency with construction. I/K i  1999 becomes less
than half of 1990. This is probably because FA and BC falls substantially in the 1990’s
from the bubble period. Other industries have similar (I/K)’s.
Although both FA and BC are more or less procyclical, they don’t seem coincide with
each other. For example in 1986 when a short period recession occurs due to a sudden
appreciation of the yen, BC (especially of manufacture) drops significantly while FA
stays its high level. It is good news for our purpose of identification of real and financial
factors.
Except FA until early 80’s,  as a whole, we have a lot of variation of FA and BC
across industries (cross-sectional variation). Also we have huge time-series variation
through the sample period. This is also good news for our purpose.
4.2 Specification and Validity of DI’s as proxies
Let’s go back to equation (4)’’. Remember that Q is used on behalf of unobservable
marginal q, which stands for the investment opportunity. Actual Q, however, as pointed
out in Section 3, may contain the information about the lender’s financial situation
(BANK) that makes it difficult to distinguish real factor from financial factor.  Moreover
Q is poor proxy for marginal q if the assumption used when we equate them are violated.
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We use BC instead of Q by industry, because BC(future business condition) can be
thought of a good proxy for investment opportunity while it does not seem to be affected
by financial factor. Also we use FA(financial attitude) as a financial factor, i.e., the net
worth effect plus banks’ financial condition. In other words, we assume FA represents the
supply curve shifter in Figure 2. Therefore we estimate the following equation.
where t,i denotes time, industry respectively. (I/K) series are seasonally adjuste  by
industry. Length of lag l is determined so that no serial correlation exists in the error
term. There are some reasons why we employ this specification and why we believe they
are good proxies for each factor.
Specification
One may wonder if the DI which is defined as the difference of the percentage
between two answers, is valid proxy or not. Suppose the manager of the firm knows
marginal q or investment opportunity of her own firm. Also suppose they answer the
question about the future business condition (BC) usi g her information about marginal
q, that is, there is a certain value of marginal q such that firms with higher marginal q
than this value answer ‘favorable’ to the question (same for ‘unfavorable’).  Under
further conditions (firms are uniformly distributed along marginal q, etc) discussed in
Appendix II, linear specification of BC can be justified. Similar can be said about FA







































First, BC has high negative correlation with KDI(correlation coefficient is –0.85),
which is conceptually  better indicator for q than BC because KDI directly asks the
question related to optimal capital stock. (See the appendix I for details.) The fact that
they are highly correlated supports BC as a proxy for q. Second, Ogawa and
Kitasaka(2000) actually construct marginal q (not verage Q) series by manufacture/non-
manufacture and large/medium/small group of firmsxxv. It turns out that BC here has
similar characteristics with those marginal q series (they have peak in 1979, 1989 and fall
sharply in 1991-1994, etc.).
Validity of FA
First, the movement of FA seems to express the movement of the balance sheet effect
of both (lender’s and borrower’s) sides well. We expect that both the firm’s balance sheet
effects and the bank’s balance sheet effect by industry should move similarly across
industry, because the difference in business condition across industry should not be
included in both effects. FA’s are actually moving very similarly except for the real estate
industryxxvi. Second, time series movement of FA’s are plausible for both balance sheet
effects. The low level of FA before 1975 and in 1980 is clearly due to tightening of
monetary policyxxvii. The decline in 1991 seems to reflect the fall of land price as well as
monetary tighteningxxviii. The decline in 1998 seems to reflect the banking crisis that




Here we estimate th  equation offered in the previous section, and investigate the rol
financial factors played.  Subsection 5.1 shows the basic estimation results and the
variants of it which support the robustness of the basic estimation. Our estimation results
show the significance and correct sign of the financial factors. In 5.2 we test the
implication of the theory explained in Section 2, that is, the more financially constrained
the industry is, the less responsive to real shocks. Our result is consistent with the theory.
Then in 5.3, comparing existing studies, aggregate effects of financial factors are
calculated using the result obtained in 5.1, which is shown to be large, but not dominant
in both periods of decline. Subsection 5.4, however, points out several problems in this
aggregate effect analyses, emphasizing the importance of ‘financial accelerator effect’,
and analyzes if there are shocks to financial factors and relates them to monetary policy.
In 5.5 we claim that if we incorporate the interaction between financial factor and real
factor, and consider appropriate shocks to financial factors, the effect of financial factors
is dominant in recent declines of investment. Also this shock to financial factor in recent
period is unrelated to monetary policy, implying that credit crunch induced by banking
crisis is the dominant reason for recent decline of investment.
5.1 Estimation of equation and robustness
Estimation results of equation (5) are given in Table 3-a. [1] gives the results by fixed
effect estimation (same hereafter)xxix using the data during 1st quarter of 1976 and 3rd
quarter of 1999 with l (length of the lagged dependent variable) equal to fourxxx. Both BC
and FA have significant positive coefficients. In order to know the magnitude of the
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estimated coefficient, simple rough calculation may be helpful. Say, FA rises by 10
points (see Figure 2-c for this magnitude). Then (I/K) increases by 0.018. Since the value
of I/K(*100:total) in 1999 3rd quarter is 1.76, given K constant, investment increases by
about 1.1% (annual rate). If we consider lagged dependent variable, since the sum of th ir
coefficients is 0.85 (see the footnote of Table 3-a), the cumulative effect will be
approximately 2.0% (annual).
[2] and [3] drop either BC or FA. [4] uses different period. They do not change the
magnitude and the significance of the estimates so much. [6] (and [5]) used constrained
FA which is equal to FA when it is lower than the mean (or 0) of FA, and equal to the
mean (or 0) otherwise. The idea behind the estimation is that FA is effective only when
the firms are ‘Constrained’, i.e., FA is low. Those modifications in FA do not change the
result so much. [7] used KDI (capacity for production DI) discussed before instead of
BC. It also does not change the coefficient  of FA so much. The estimated coefficient of
KDI is larger than the others because the variation of KDI is smaller (see T ble 2). We
also include the square of BC, FA and the product of FA and BCxxxi, none of them turn
out to be significant. [8] estimates the equation (5) using aggregate data. Although the
estimation gives the significant estimated coefficients for both BC and FA, the magnitude
of those coefficients are smaller than those obtained when using panel data. [9] used
instrumental variable method, since both FA and BC may be suffering endogene ty bias,
i.e., they may be correlated with error term. We tried various instruments and give the
result using one and two period lagged value of FA and BC. Both do not change the
results.
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Since specification [1] is robust to various perturbation, we use [1] in 5.3 to calculate
the aggregate effect of each factor.
5.2 Test of the theory: Are more financially constrained industries less responsive to
real shocks?xxxii
Here we test the question above in the following manner. We create dummy
variables, Db (and Dg) which is equal to 1 when FA is smaller (larg ) than the critical
value FA* (for example, -10), i.e., financially constrained, and is equal to 0 (1) otherwise.
We estimate the same equation using both Db*BC and Dg*BC instead of BC. By this we
expect the coefficient of the former is smaller than the latter since industries are more
likely to be  financially constrained when Db equals 1.
Table 3-b shows the results. [0] is replicated from [1] of Table 3-b. [1]-[5] are the
results when FA* is set 10, 0, -5, -10, -20, respectively. We can notice that the coefficient
of BC at bad stage is always bigger than that of good s age, an  as FA* goes down the
difference between the two coefficients gets larger. The difference is significant at 5%
level when FA* is -20. This finding is consistent with the theory in Section 2.
The last two rows of Table 3-b shows the number of observations at bad stage and the
number of real estate industry o t of them. We can find that the percentage of real estate
climbs as the difference of the two coefficients gets larger, which imply the real estate
industry, especially in the 1990’s, are more heavily constrained by the upward sloping
parts of the supply curve as in Figure 1-b.
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5.3 Aggregate effect and comparison with other empirical studies
Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) estimate the equation similar to (4)’, i.e., regress I/K on
marginal q series (real factor) they construct and bank lending (presumably financial
factor), by small/medium/large and manufacture/non-manufacture firms separately. They
find bank lending is significant for small firms in both manufacture and non-manufacture
while it is not for large manufacture firms, which is predicted in Section 2 of this paper.
They report that the effect of the shrink of bank lending in 1992-1993 on aggregate
investment is 16.1% (93Q1) and in 1997-1998 it is 9.3% (98Q1) (both in deviation from
actual aggregate investment: aximum effect in each case) by setting bank lending row
at the same rate as previous three years.
Yoshikawa and Motonishi (1999) estimated the equation (5) using the data by
small/large and manufacture/non-manufacture separately (four equations). They show FA
is significant and larger for small firms than large firms. They simulate by setting FA in
96Q2-98Q2 to be the mean of the period 95Q2-96Q2 and conclude that the growth rate of
investment dropped about 10% in 1998 due to FAxxxiii.
In order to compare our result (we use basic estimation result [1] below) with those
studies, we do the similar simulation. We set FA and BC during two recessions (92-94,
98-99) to be the mean of the whole sample period when they go below the mean. For
example, the mean of FA(total) for the whole sample period is 14. In 1992-1994, FA
(total) went below 14 beginning in the 2nd quarter of 1990 and recover 14 in the 3rd
quarter of 1994. For within 18 period, FA (total) was below 14. We fix FA (total) for
these 18 periods to be 14 (= mean of FA(total)), generate new investment series, and
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compare this with actual investment series. The difference is assumed to be caused by
financial factors.
Figure 3 gives a graphical exposition of setting of simulations. FA-1,2 and BC-1,2 are
simulation names for FA and BC respectively. FA-2 and BC-2 start at the same time
(from 4th quarter of 1997) by happening. At this start point, heso-called banking crisis
occurred.
Table 4 gives the results for each simulation. Left table shows the percentage
deviation of new investment series from actual investment series in each simulation. For
example, we can interpret the cell of  FA-1 and 2nd quarter of 1994 (=5.8) that, under
simulation FA-1, level of investment would have been 5.8% higher than the actual
investment. Also right table shows the change in growth rate of investment due to the
change in either FA or BC. We can interpret the cell of FA-1 and 1991 (=2.3) that the
growth rate of investment under simulation FA is higher by 2.3% points than the ac ual
growth rate of investment in 1991.
Deviation table shows that although all of the simulations have considerable effects
on the level of investment, the effects of BC are higher in both cases. This reflects
coefficient of BC is far larger than that of FA in the basic estimation [1].
Right table shows that BC is dominant in both periods also in growth terms. In the
first period (1992-94), especially in 1993-94, BC contributes 7.1% annually while actual
investment growth is –8.0% annually. In the second period, BC is enough to bring
negative growth of investment to positive. FA also contributes but not dominantly as BC.
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Comparison with Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000)
They report the financial effects are 16.1% (93Q ) and 9.3% (98Q1) in deviation. For
the first period, since they assumed bank lending grows at the same rate as in 1987-1989
when the investment boom, we reset FA to be 33, which is the mean of those three years
and obtain 11.4%(93Q1) in deviation, which is a bit smaller number than their result.
Similarly for the second period, we fix FA to be 17 which is similarly computed and
obtain 3.5%(98Q1), which is also smaller than their result.
These differences in results seem due to the difference of the variables used. They use
lagged lending to capture the supply of loan (financial factor) while we use FA to capture
the supply side behavior. Lagged lending could be affected by the real factor as well as
the financial factor if the demand shocks are serially correlated. The comparison of the
effects of real factor show that our real factor effect is a bit larger than theirs under the
same conditionxxxiv, which imply that their lagged lending includes the real factor effect
as well.
Comparison with Yoshikawa and Motonishi(1999)
They report that if FAs after 96Q3 are set to be the mean of the period 95Q2-96Q2,
which is 19 in our case, the growth rate of investment for 1998 increases by 10%. If we
do the same simulation by setting FA to be 19, we get 5.6% increase in 1998, that is
smaller than their result.
Simple weighted average of coefficients of FA reported in their study is 0.0028
(quarterly rate) which is larger than our estimated coefficient 0.0018. Since they use
time-series data, unlike our estimation of panel data, it is possible that their estimates are
imprecise.
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5.4 Causes, interaction and the relationship with monetary policy
Although our study as well as existing studies so far verifies the importance of the
financial factors, there are several problems unanswered.
First, we have not yet clarified if the financial factor is really the ‘cause’ of those
declines. It could be the case that at first some real shock occurs, whi h eventually causes
the depress of financial variables that subsequently induce the decline of investment. In
other words, we are not sure if we should give particular shock to FA as in previous
analysis, since the decline of FA may be caused by the real shock.
Second, closely related to the first point, we have not incorporate the ‘financial
accelerator’ effect, that is, the int raction between the financial factor and real factor.
More specifically, if there is a positive shock in the financial factors, this  works to
increase GDP through investment, which enhance the prospect of business condition
(BC), which again increase GDP through investment and so forth. We may have
underestimated the financial factor effect by neglecting this interaction in the previous
analysis.
Third, the role of the policy variable was unclear in the previous analysis. Although
it is difficult to perform well specified policy analysis, at least we would like to make
sure if the cause of the problem is related to some policy variable, especially monetary
policy.
To deal with these problems, we try the following analyses. First, we construct a
simple VAR (Vector auto-regression) model which includes FA (total) and BC (total) in
order to analyze the interaction using impulse response function. VAR can also be used
to check if there were shocks to FA and BC uring declines. Second, we regress the
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change in FA (total) on the change in call rate which is thought to be an indicator of
Japanese monetary policy, to relate the financial factor to monetary policy.
VAR analysis
Building a rigorous general equilibrium model is a diff cult task and far beyond the
scope of this paper. As a preliminary analysis, we construct asimple three variable (BC,
FA and growth rate of real GDP) VAR model and use the impulse response function to
compute the response of BC and FA to the initial shock of FA and BC. Figure 4 shows
the impulse response functionsxxxv. Notice that BC responds positively to the shock of
FA, although FA react negatively to the shock of BC. The positive response of BC to FA
shocks can be viewed as ‘financial accelerator effect’xxxvi. Therefore under those
interactions the effect of FA is larger than the previous analysis while that of BC is
smaller. We will actually calculate this interaction or financial accelerator effect later.
Figure 5 is the residuals of FA and BC equation in VAR analysis, i.e., unpredicted
movements of FA and BC by their (contemporary and) lagged variables. Hence we can
think of them as independent shocks to FA and BC. It is interesting to note that we have
two significant negative shocks in FA, 90Q4(-9) and 98Q1(-18).
Monetary Policy and FA analysis
In order to relate the movement of FA to monetary shock, we regress the change of
FA to the change in call rate. Figure 6 gives the movements of official discount rate, call
rate and FA. We can easily make sure a contemporary or lagged relationship between
both interest rates and FA. Therefore we regress the change in FA on the contemporary
and lagged change in call ratexxxvii. Figure 7 shows the estimation results as well as the
actual and predicted change using the first column’s result. It generally shows that much
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of the fluctuation of FA can be explained by the change of call rate, and 1% point
increase in call rate induces a 4 to 6 points increase in FA. Also the figure shows that
while the negative shock of FA in 1990-91 can be largely explained by monetary policy,
the huge negative shock in 1998 is totally unexplained by the movement of call rate and
this size of unexplained negative shock is historically an irregular event.
5.5 Aggregate effect again
Using the information obtained in the previous subsection, we recalculate the
aggregate effect of the financial factors, taking the interaction of the variables into
account. More specifically we simulate two situations: what would have happened to
investment (1) if call rate was not raised during 1990-1991, and (2) if there was no credit
crunch induced by banking crisis, i.e., no large negative shock in FA in 1998? We
proceed in the following manner. First, some plausible initial shocks which correspond to
two situations are given to FA. Those shocks are translated to the change of FA and BC
in the following periods through impulse response functions estimated in the previous
subsection. Using those series of shocks in FA and BC, similar calculation about
aggregate effect is done. Notice that here, unlike in subsection 5.3, effect of BC
originated by the initial shock of FA is considered to be financial factor effect.
We use the following initial shocks. For the first situation (call this FA-1’), FA is
increased by 10 points in he 4th quarter of 1990 and also 5 points in the 1st quarter of
1991. We choose those periods and magnitude because (a) VAR residual analysis
indicates negative shocks in FA in those period (-9.0(90Q4), -4.6(91Q1)), (b) Monetary
policy and FA analysis shows that gradual 4% increase in call rate (see Figure 6) during
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1989-1990 has negative shock on FA about 20 point (cumulatively). For the second
situation (call this FA-2’), FA is increased by 10 points in the 4th quarter of 1997 and 20
points in the 1st quarter of 1998 because (a)VAR analysis implies negative shock in this
period (-16(98Q1)) which corresponds credit crunch induced by banking crisis, (b)
Monetary Policy and FA analysis shows FA declined by 30 points unrelated to monetary
policy during the period. We can make sure the plausibility of the assumption about
initial shocks by Figure 8, where FA-1’,2’ and corresponding BC’s are drawn.
Table 5 gives the results. Column named ‘General’ and ‘Partial’ stand for the effect
with and without the change of BC. In other words, ‘General’ incorporates the
interaction, i.e., financial accelerator effect while ‘Partial’ not. A comparison between
them may highlight the importance of the interaction. In FA-1’, in deviation ‘General’
effect is more than twice of  ‘Partial’ effect at its peak. In the growth term, ‘General’
effect is 4% in 1991-92 while ‘Partial’ effect is less than 2%. Although this ‘General’
effect is large, the financial factor is still not a dominating factor in this period. In FA-2’,
‘General’ effect is also twice of ‘Partial’ effect in deviation. In the growth table,
‘General’ effect is overwhelmingly large, averaged 10% during 1998-99. These
correspond to the increase of GDP growth of 1.5%(1998) and 1.6%(1999) where actual
GDP growth rate was –2.5%(1998) and 0.3%(1999). Of course they do not include so-
called multiplier effects which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, comparison
with the contribution of public investment to GDP growth, which is 1.2%(1993, see




This paper ties to answer the question: how important are the financial factors in two
declines of corporate investment in 1990’s in Japan? We find:
(1) in 1992-1994 the financial factor, specifically an increase in call rate during 1989-91,
partly contributed to the decline of investment especially indirectly through the real
factor, but it was not a dominant factor, and
(2) in 1998-1999 credit crunch which is induced by so-called banking crisis played a
significant role in the decline of investment directly and indirectly. Eliminating this
shock leads the corporate investment to positive growth from negative 7-8% growth,
and
(3) incorporating interaction between financial factors and real factors (financial
accelerator effect) greatly increases the estimate of financial factor effect. In other
words, considering only direct effect may lead to significant underestimate of
financial factor effect.
Looking ahead Figure 9 reports recent movementsxxxviii of DI’  used in this analysis. All
of them seem to be moving toward desirable direction though the levels still does not
reach to the 1996-97 standard. It does not necessarily guarantee the recovery of corporate
investment, but it seems highly likely so.
Finally we point out some drawbacks of this analysis. First, we neglect he fact that
many large firms have been changing the route of finance from through bank or indirect
financial intermediary to through direct capital marketxxxix. For example, according to
Packer (1999), from 1996 to 1998 the issuance of corporate bonds increased more than
46% from 30.8 trillion yen to about 45 trillion yen. At the same period, loans from
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Japan’s banking sector decreased about 17 trillion yen (in 1999 total loan amounts to 489
trillion yen). This structural change works to soften the effect of credit crunch effect.
Second, we could not differentiate between small and large firm’s investment behavior.
As in the analysis by Yoshikawa and Motonishi (1999) and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000),
their investment may be affected  by financial factor differently. Since we could not
obtain investment data by industry and by size, our estimation treat both size of firms in a
same way. Hence the estimated coefficient of FA is thought to be weighted average of
various size of firms. Third, we neglect various factors which affect cost of capital such
as tax policy and price of capital goods. As Hasset and Hubbard (1997) shows, tax policy
may have significant effect on investment and actually Japanese tax policy has changed




Source: The Capital stock statistics of private corporations by Economic Planning Agency. Can be
obtained in www.epa.go.jp (in Japanese)
Diffusion Index :
 Source: The Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan (Tankan), Bank of Japan). Can be
obtained in www.boj.or.jp
(quotation from the survey) The Survey is conducted to provide an accurate picture of business trends
of enterprises in Japan. The survey is conducted quarterly in March, June, September, and
December(February, May, August and November from 1957 to 1996). For the following items,
responding enterprises are  asked to choose one alternative among three as the best descriptor of
prevailing conditions, excluding seasonal factors at the time of the survey and three months hence.
[Number of sample enterprises (as of  March 2000)]
                                          Manufacturing      Nonmanufacturing  Total  (Response rate)
 All Enterprises                            3,879                        5,326         9,205  ( 95.3%)
  of which Large enterprises           775                      652       1,427  ( 97.1%)
           Medium-sized enterprises         1,110                    1,802       2,912  ( 95.7%)
           Small enterprises                      1,994                     2,872       4,866  ( 94.5%)
Business conditions: Judgement of general business conditions, primarily in light of the individual
current profits.
[1)Favorable. 2)Not so favorable. 3)Unfavorable.]
Production capacity: Judgement of the excessiveness, adequacy, or shortage of production capacity,
excluding a shortage caused by temporary conditions such as the closure of a factory for repairs.
[1)Excessive capacity. 2)Adequate. 3)Insufficient capacity.]
Lending attitude of financial institutions: Judgement of financial institutions' attitude towards
lending as perceived by the responding enterprise.
[1) Accommodative. 2)Not so severe. 3)Severe.
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Appendix II
Here we derive the condition which ensures the sp cification (5), that is, BC and FA are linear in
the investment capital ratio. (This appendix partly follows Yoshikawa and Motonishi(1999)).
First suppose the capital market is perfect.(Recall Figure 1-a.)Let x be the variable representing
the extent of business condition. Assume that firms are uniformly distributed along x and let au(t) and
al(t) be the upper bound and lower bound of the density of  x,and define a(t) = au(t) – al(t).(a(t) is the
width of the density and t denotes time.) Let c(t) be the point on x such that firms with x over the point
answer ‘Favorable’ about their future business condition. Similarly define the point under which firms
answer ‘Unfavorable’ but normalize the point to be zero. Hence firms between zero and c(t) answer
‘Not so favorable’. Therefore our diffusion index BC is
 where
Assume firms follow the following investment rule:
Letting F( ) be the distribution of x, aggregate investment can be expressed as
Assuming F( ) is independent of Ki, and using (A.1)
Further assuming a(width of density) and c(ratio of indifferent) is fixed over time, we obtain the
expression of (5) under perfect capital market(without FA).
Note that we are not restricting the support to move as economic situation changes.
Next we take FA into consideration. (Recall Figure 1-b). In order for FA to be in linear form as in
equation (5),
must be constant for all level of FA. Since (I/K) is the weighted average of (I/K) of unconstrained
firms and constrained firms, and unconstrained firms do not respond to the shock in FA
(d(I/K)/dFA=0 for unconstrained firms), we only need to be constant for all FA. Here W( ) denotes th
ratio of constrained firm. Since W( ) is the decreasing in FA, the first term must be increasing function

























































































of FA to keep the constancy. (Second derivative is positive.) In Figure 1-b, this requires the slope of
the supply curve is steeper the less the financial factor
is severe. This is clearly counterintuitive. To fix this problem, we need to discard the assumption of
linearity of FA and introduce higher order of FA. Despite this finding we use linear form for FA as a
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Footnotes
                                              
i Stock price (Nikkei 225) tripled from December 1985 to December 1989. Similarly the price index
for commercial land in six metropolitan cities tripled between March 1986 and August 1990. Stock
price declined by 60% between 1990 and August 1992. Land prices also declined by half from 1991 to
1995. See chapter 5 of  Cargill, Hutchinson and Ito(1997).
ii One of the main reason for the sudden recovery is fiscal stimulus in 1995. See Posen(1 98).
iii  Kiyotaki and West(1996) is in this line. They claim that the investment behavior in the late 80’s and
early 90’s can be mainly explained by shocks in optimal capital stock and cost of capital alone.
iv During 1985-90, corporate investment has grown by 10.4% annually.
v Without the assumption of homogenous capital goods, marginal q which represents investment
opportunity may be different from average q which is related to the excessiveness of capital stock.
vi See Mishkin(1998).
vii Roughly speaking, the internationally active banks are required 8% capital ratio.
viii See Woo(1999) and Ito and Sasaki(2000) for example.
ix For the precise explanation of financial system shock at this period, see Hayakawa and
Maeda(2000). For chronology see appendix II of Sekine(1999).
x See Kiyotaki and Moore(1997) and Bernanke et. al.(1998) for this type of dynamic model.
xi Average Q is calculated as firm’  market value over replacement cost of the firm’s capital stock.
xii See Hubbard(1998) for details.
xiii Ito and Sasaki(2000) show the importance of moral hazard behavior of failing banks. That is, the
more non-performing loan does banks have, the more risky loan they will make (so-called evergreen
effect). Therefore financial variable of banks could have both positive and negative effect on lending.
We believe that this evergreen effect is limited to operating funds, not funds for investment because
the investment of construction and real estate, which are dubbed as the evergr ened industry in Ito and
Sasaki(2000), declined more than any other industry (Figure 2-b). Hence we use the term “lending” as
the lending for investment funds, not operating funds so that financial variable of banks are assumed
to have only positive(the worse bank, lend less) effect on investment.
xiv We will mention the analysis using aggregate data by Yoshikawa and Motonishi(1999) and Ogawa
and Kitasaka(2000) in detail below.
xv For example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Perterson(1988) use dividend payment ratio as a criterion.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein(1991) use Japanese firm data grouping the firm if the firm belongs to
Keiretsu, industrial group. This a priori grouping is the one of the criticism against those literture. Hu
and Snhiantarelli(1998) used Regime-Switching model instead of a priori grouping criteria.
xvi Hayashi(1997) use different data set and conclude that the result obtained in the Hoshi et.al.(1991)
is due to poor quality of the data.
xvii See also Gibson(1995) for similar analysis.
xviii Ogawa and Kitasaka(1999) using Japanese data concluded that signal from stock market were
contaminated by noise unrelated to the fundamental profitability of the invesemnt project.
xix This problem is noted by most of the literture. For example, Hoshi et.a .(1991) noted this point and
show that the difference of coefficients between two group is significantly large, under the assumption
that he grouping variable and Q are not systematically correlated.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg(1995) argues, however, that this assumption is probably violated
because Q of constrained (newer and smaller) firms has less information than that of
unconstrained(older and larger) firms, vice versa for cash flow. This makes the coefficient of cash
flow for constrained firm larger than that for unconstrained firms even if both groups of firms are not
financially constrained. They mitigate the problem using ‘fundamental’ Q and cash flow estimated by
VAR.
Kaplan and Zingales(1997) criticizes th  approach showing that the more financially constrained
the group is, the less responsive to cash flow, by their grouping. They also argues that there is no
theoretical reason to believe the monotonic increase in sensitivity to cash flow as constraint gets more
strict.
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xx Yoshikawa and Motonishi(1999) reports that in 1990Q1 the investment share of the
large/small(L/S) and manufacture/non-manufacture firm(M/NM) are 16%(L&M), 10%(L&NM),
22%(S&M) and 52%(S&NM) using the definition that the firm with capital over one billion yen is
large firm.
xxi The approach which use the specification (4)’ or (4)’’ to estimate each effect itself is also
problematic in the sense that we are estimating the degree of capital market imperfection using the
model whose null hypothesis is perfect capital market. In other words, we do not know how the
variable which represent financing constrained enters the investment equation. See Chirinko(1997) for
the structural approach.
xxii The period in which whole data are available is from 74Q3 to 99Q3. Since we want to avoid the
bias because of economic condition, we choose 76Q1 as a starting point. (According to EPA, the
trough lies in 75Q1 and the peak in 77Q1. )
xxiii These DI’s are different from commonly used DI’s for ‘Principal Enterprises’. Since our purpose
is to explain aggregate investment, we use DI’s for ‘All enterprises’ which covers all sizes of firms.
The former is the subset of the latter.
xxiv Telecommunication & Transportation and Public Utility does not appear in the figure for brevity
although they are used in the estimation. Agricultural, mining and finance & insurance  industry is
excluded from the estimation because they are not included in BOJ survey. Relative sizes of
investment of each industry are 6%,0.2% and 4%. Therefore our estimation covers about 90% of
aggregate investment.
xxv They use the method proposed by Abel and Blanchard(1986). They first construct  profit rate and
discount factor series. Then they used VAR model to forecast future series of them and construct
marginal q.
xxvi Real estate should have different FA series for some  reasons. First, their own balance sheet effect
moves differently under the decline of land price. Second, Ministry of Finance restrict the bank
lending to real estate starting in April 1990. This is effective measure, hence huge decline of real
estate’s FA can be explained by this measure. See chapter 5 of C rgil, Hutchison and Ito(1997).
xxvii Discount rate has been increased up to 9% and decreased in April 1975 to 8.5%. Also it went up to
9% and decreased in August 1980 to 8.25%. We will investigate the relationship later.
xxviii Discount rate was decreased July 1991 from 6% to 5.5%. Also land price begin to fall in late
1991.
xxix We performed Breusch and Pagan test and reject null hypothesis of no random effect. Then we
employ Hausman specification test and concluded random effect specification is misspecified.
Therefore we employ fixed effect estimation.
xxx We test for serial correlation following Yoshikawa and Motonishi(1999). After obtaining the error
term e, we regress e on first to lth lagged value of e. We could not reject the null hypothesis that none
of the lagged e are significant in the usual significance level(no serial correlation) when l is set to be
four.(till third lag, we reject the null.)
xxxi Actually we used square of FA or BC plus 100 instead, so that they are always positive.
xxxii We try various specification to see if different industry behave differently. We group industries
into 1.construction plus real estate, 2.other industries, and estimate the same equation separately since
the first group may be more financially constrained due to the fall of land price. We also try different
grouping. None of them give us sensible results. Although real estate and construction suffer heavily
in 90’s, they enjoyed 80s’ and the response can be contaminated by whole those period.
Then we simply group all observation into 1.when FA is above certain value(unconstrained), 2.
Otherwise(constrained), and estimate the same equation separately, hoping that coefficient of BC is
bigger for group 1 than group 2, and opposite for the coefficient of FA. Again we could not get
significant results. Therefore in this subsection we maintain this grouping and additionally assume the
response to FA is same for both groups.
xxxiii They also simulate the effect of FA in the decline of 1992-94 by setting FA to be zero. They show
FA actually work ‘against’ the decline and concluded that financial factor is not significant for the
decline.
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xxxiv For the first period, they get 27% as the real factor effect assuming that their averaged marginal q
is equal to that of 1988-89. Under the FA of this period that is 24, we get 32%. They do not report the
real factor effect for the second period.
xxxv Four lags are chosen by AIC and Schwarz criterion. Consumption tax dummy in the 2nd quarter of
1989 and 1997 are included. Impulse response is computed using orthogonalized shock of magnitude
1. Choleski decomposition is used with the ordering growth of real GDP, BC and FA. This ordering
does not significantly affect the results..
xxxvi We do not any reason for he negative response of FA to BC.
xxxvii We also add land price growth, which turns out to be insignificant.
xxxviii Results as of March 2000 was published April 3rd.
xxxix More fundamentally we are implicitly assuming that loans and bonds are not perfect substitutes.
